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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner-Appellant Erick Virgil Hall ("Hall") appeals, with permission from the
Idaho Supreme Court, from two of the district court's interlocutory orders, which include
(1) Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict

Counsel and (2) Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider;
and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order.

Statem~11J

Qf The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings

On May 20, 2003, Hall was charged with the first-degree murder and rape of
Cheryl Ann Hanlon ("Cheryl"). (R., pp.IO, 54.) Hall was initially represented by Amil
Myshin and D.C. Carr. (Id.) However, because Hall was earlier convicted of the firstdegree murder, kidnapping, and rape of Lynn Beth Henneman ("Lynn") and following
that conviction a post-conviction petition was filed contending Myshin and Carr were
ineffective ("Hall I"), Robert Chastain and Deborah Kristal were appointed to represent
Hall in the case involving Cheryl ("Hall II").

(R., pp.10 n.1, 11, 54-55.) Hall was

convicted of Cheryl's first-degree murder and rape, and the district court sentenced him
to death for first-degree murder and consecutive fixed life for rape. (R., pp.10, 54-55.)
With the assistance of the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD"), Hall filed a
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief challenging his convictions and death sentence in Hall
II (R., pp.9-51); an amended petition was filed that included multiple claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel involving all four of his trial attorneys (R., pp.117-300).
The state filed answers (R., pp.53-83, 923-1057) and motions for orders waiving the
attorney-client privilege requesting Hall's four trial attorneys provide the state a "copy of
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the same documents [they] provide[] to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office"
and that the state be permitted to "discuss this case" with the four attorneys because of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in the post-conviction petition (R, pp.8491). After a hearing (Tr., pp.73-103), the motions were granted (R., pp.1249-51).
On June 29, 2010, the SAPD filed a sealed Ex Parte Notice of Possible Conflict
of Interest asserting a "possible conflict of interest regarding the State Appellate Public
Defender (SAPD) representing Mr. Hall

these post-conviction proceedings."

(R.,

p.2043) ("Ex Parte Notice," p.1). 1 The SAPD's notice reiterated that, after Hall was
convicted in Hall I, the SAPD was appointed to represent him during Hall I postconviction proceedings while his case in Hall II proceeded to trial. (Id., pp.1-2.) The
SAPD's representation in IIall I involved the retention of experts, resulting in "overlap
between some of the experts and testing in Hall I and Hall II," and it was the SAPD' s
"understanding" the district court "encouraged the SAPD to cooperate with Mr. Hall's
trial counsel in Hall II by sharing testing results and expert reports, in an effort to
preclude duplication of efforts and unnecessary expenditure of scarce resources." (Id.,
p.2.) "The SAPD cooperated with trial counsel in Hall II by sharing testing and expert
information obtained in Hall I" post-conviction proceedings. (Id.) As a result, attorneys
with the SAPD's office "may have had contact with trial counsel [in Hall II] and that
contact may present a conflict of interest in the SAPD' s continued representation of :\-fr.
Hall" in Hall II post-conviction proceedings.

(Id., pp.2-3 .)

Therefore, the SAPD

determined "independent counsel should be hired to independently evaluate the conflict."

1

Hall's motion, along with various other sealed documents, was later unsealed and
submitted as an exhibit to the record.
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(Id., p.3.) Dennis Benjamin was "contacted" and "agreed to evaluate the conflict and
advise Mr. Hall whether or not the conflict should be waived." (Id.)
Although the state was not notified regarding the SAPD's Ex Parle Notice, on
July 30, 2010, "in an abundance of caution and in an effort to avoid unnecessary delays,"
the state filed a Motion for Inquiry into Possible SAPD Conflict requesting the court
"inquire of [the SAPD] to ensure that there is no conflict" even though an attorney from
the SAPD's office represented no conflict existed. (R., pp.1288-90).
At a hearing on August 6, 2010, the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice and the state's
motion were discussed with the SAPD agreeing the Ex Parte Notice was "not very
specific," was even "opaque," and "didn't include any facts." (Tr., pp.241-42.) After
requiring that the state be provided a copy of the Ex Parte Notice (Tr., pp.247-48), the
district court reviewed relevant law and concluded it had "an affirmative duty to conduct
an inquiry, and notice "the adequacy of th[ e] Court's inquiry is a constitutional issue"
(Tr., pp.252-53). The Court further explained the question of whether a conflict actually
exists "is a matter for the Court to decide" (Tr., p.255), and while it may have been
"prudent" for the SAPD to "engage" Benjamin, it is the court's "obligation to conduct an
inquiry ... and make those determinations" irrespective of "Benjamin's views on that
subject when [the court had] not appointed him as conflict Counsel" (Tr., p.256).
The SAPD agreed, explaining, "We've reviewed the same case law and we're not
in disagreement with anything Your Honor's stated, as far as the Court's duty, the
Court's obligation, the Court's prerogative and power" and, although Benjamin "is the
SAPD's institutional conflict Counsel," the SAPD recognized "the Court may want to
select independent Counsel of the Court's own choosing." (Tr., p.258.) Nevertheless,
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the SAPD requested the state's motion be denied until Benjamin could "finish his
investigation, understanding that the Court has to be satisfied and that the Court is very
unlikely to be satisfied with current Counsel's representations." (Tr., p.261.) The SAPD
filed a response to the state's motion reiterating many of the prior arguments to the court.
(R., pp.1296-1309.)

While setting a hearing on the state's motion, the district court

reiterated it would be "happy to hear from Mr. Benjamin," but advising although it "may
well have been appropriate and prudent" for the SAPD "to have engaged another mind on
this issue," the court "wanted to be clear" even though the SAPD called him
"independent doesn't mean that he's been appointed by the Court, or that [the Court]
would be persuaded, and

and certainly not bound by, his views." (Tr., p.268.) The

SAPD agreed with the court's comments. (Id.)
The state filed a brief supporting its motion (R., pp.1310-16) and the SAPD filed
a response, conceding, "neither the court nor the State should necessarily be satisfied
with representations made by the SAPD as to the nature of any potential conflict," but,
contrary to the prior position at the August 6, 2010 hearing, the SAPD contended,
"representations made by Mr. Benjamin, as independent conflict counsel, should not
suffer the same skepticism and would certainly allow the Court to rely on his
representations" (R., p.1320), an argument reiterated in Hall's "three suggested paths of
inquiry" (R., pp.1323-25). However, the SAPD conceded if the court did not rely upon
Benjamin's representations it still had "the discretion to appoint independent counsel,"
but contended the costs would be incurred by the district court because the SAPD had
allegedly met its obligation under LC. § 19-871 to obtain "independent counsel" and
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appointment of another attorney would "amount to expert opinion regarding the nature
andextentoftheconflict"underl.C. §§ 19-860(b)and 19-4904. (R.,p.1325.)
On August 26, 2010, a hearing was held on the state's motion. (Tr., pp.277-378.)
The SAPD noted Benjamin was at the hearing and that the purpose of his retention by the
SAPD "was not to advise the State Appellate Public Defender as to whether there was a
conflict," but "to evaluate it and to take that straight to Mr. Hall, and for Mr. Hall, then,
to be able to come in front of the court and say, I've got a conflict." (Tr., p.283.)
Although the SAPD conceded the district court "has an obligation to be satisfied, truly
satisfied, that there's no conflict" (Tr., p.289), the SAPD gave a "qualified objection" to
the state's motion (Tr., p.286), explaining the court should first hear from Benjamin, and
if he said "I've reviewed all the materials, I've seen this, I've spoken with Mr. Hall, and
there's simply no conflict," there would be no need for further inquiry; otherwise the
SAPD "wouldn't have grounds to really object to an investigation by the Court" (Tr.,
pp.289-90). Moreover, the SAPD conceded, "we've been compromised. That's why we
would ask the Court to rely on conflict Counsel." (Tr., p.293.)
After hearing arguments, the district court granted the state's motion, but then
inquired regarding the "proper scope of the inquiry." (Tr., pp.294-95.) Because the court
did not have sufficient information regarding even the existence of a possible conflict, the
court declined to hear from Benjamin, but ordered the SAPD to

an amended notice

providing "something more specific about the ... basis for saying there is ... a potential
conflict or not" beyond "contact." (Tr., pp.310-11.) Resisting the court's order, the
SAPD contended, "We are not able to provide additional information to this Court
because we don't represent Mr. Hall on this issue anymore, Mr. Benjamin docs." (Tr.,
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p.317.) The court reiterated the information it was seeking was the basis for SAPD's
filing the

Parte Notice and the nature of the "contact" between the SAPD and Hall's

attorneys in Hall IL (Tr., pp.328-332.)
The SAPD filed an Amended Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest (R., pp.133640), stating "there were numerous contacts between trial counsel and post-conviction
counsel," which included, "emails back and forth, primarily between Mr. Ackley and Ms.
Kristal; phone calls between Mr. Ackley and Ms. Kristal or Mr. Chastain; meetings on at
least two occasions where all attorneys were present; in addition to contacts with staff of
the SAPD in order to facilitate or arrange the exchange of information regarding testing
and experts" (R., p.1338); the amended notice did not discuss the genesis of the SAPD's

Ex Parte Notice or the nature of any contact with the trial attorneys in Hall IL Moreover,
the amended notice stated, "any further disclosure as to the specific content of those
communications should be directed at Mr. Benjamin." (Id). Benjamin filed a Limited
Notice of Appearance for purposes of "the conflict of interest

only" (R., p.1341 ),

and an affidavit under seal ("Benjamin Affidavit") (R., pp.1343-44, 2043). The state
responded to the amended notice (R., p.2043), and the SAPD filed a "letter" raising
various options the court could utilize to resolve the "conflict inquiry" (R., pp.1349-53).
After another hearing (Tr., pp.348-78), on December 27, 2010, the district court
entered

Memorandum Decision and Order (R., pp.1368-78). Based in part upon the

vague and conclusory nature of the SAPD and Benjamin's pleadings, particularly
regarding the "factual basis for the filing of the Ex Parte Notice," the court concluded it
was "presently lacking the factual background necessary to reach any conclusion"
regarding the existence of a conflict stemming from the SAPD representing Hall during
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Hall I post-conviction proceedings, having simultaneous "contact" with Hall's trial
attorneys during Hall II guilt and sentencing phases, and then contending his trial
attorneys were ineffective during the guilt and sentencing phases in Hall II. (R., pp.137375.)

Because it was "lacking enough facts" the court appointed R. Keith Roark as

independent conflict counsel to "conduct an inquiry into whether a conflict exists," which
could include "a thorough and searching review of the SAPD's pre-trial, trial and presentence involvement in the trial of Hall II up to its appointment to represent the
Petitioner in this Hall II post-conviction and appeal case." (R., pp.1375-76.) The court
rejected the SAPD's request that Roark's appointment "be at county expense since our
office has already paid for the exact same service being provided" because, the court
explained, "the SAPD has not provided the 'exact same service."' (R., pp.1376-77.)
On January 10, 2011, the SAPD filed a motion to reconsider (R., pp.1379-1414),
permission to appeal (R., pp.1461-1480), and to take judicial notice of various documents
from an unrelated capital post-conviction case, Abdullah v. State, #SPOT 0500308 (R.,
pp.1485-90). The district court denied all three motions. (R., pp.1965-88, 2010-14.) The
SAPD also filed a motion to appeal the district court's order denying reconsideration (R.,
pp.1989-2000), which was likewise denied by the district court (R., pp.2006-09).
The SAPD filed a motion to appeal the district court's Memorandum Decision
and Order with the Idaho Supreme Court, which was granted. (R., pp.2023-24.) The
SAPD's motion to appeal the district court's order denying reconsideration and to
consolidate was also granted by the supreme court.

(R., pp.2-3.)

appeal were filed by the SAPD. (R., pp.2015-22, 2025-33.)
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Timely notices of

ISSUES

Hall has phrased the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Whether The District Court Was Justified In Ordering A Second
Conflict Inquiry Where A Conflict Evaluation Had Already Been
Conducted By An Independent Attorney Who Found No Conflict,
The Petitioner Did Not Raise A Conflict, And Neither The State
Nor The Court Can Identify Any Specific Facts That Would Either
Undermine Those Determinations Or Give Rise To A Conflict?

2.

Whether The District Court Violated The Separation Of Powers By
Ordering The SAPD To Pay For Services Already Provided Under
The Statute Designating The Authority To Provide Conflict
Counsel Specifically To The SAPD Where There Is No Evidence
The SAPD Or Independent Counsel Failed To Satisfy Their
Obligation?

3.

Whether The District Court Erred In Ordering The Disclosure Of
Confidential And Attorney Client Privileged Information In
Furtherance Of An Unjustified Second Conflict Inquiry?

(Brief, p.5) (capitalization and punctuation in original).
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Because the SAPD refused to provide further information that would permit the
district court to conduct a thorough and searching inquiry into whether the SAPD
had a conflict of interest based upon contact with trial counsel, has Hall failed to
establish the court erred by appointing independent conflict counsel to assist the
court in its thorough and searching inquiry regarding the existence of a possible
conflict?

2.

Because Hall's separation of powers argument was not raised before the district
court, has it been waived?
Alternatively,
Because LC. § 19-871 deals with the payment of counsel and not the appointment
of counsel, has Hall failed to establish the district court erred by appointing Roark
to assist the court in conducting a thorough and searching inquiry into the
existence of a conflict of interest?

3.

Has Hall failed to establish the district court's order appointing Roark and
requiring that he assist the court in its thorough and searching inquiry improperly
violates rules of confidentiality?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Did Not Err By Conducting An Inquiry Into The Existence Of A
Possible Conflict Of Interest That Included The Appointment Of Independent Conflict
Counsel To Investigate The Existence Of A Possible Conflict Of Interest
A.

Introduction
Hall contends because neither he, the SAPD, nor Benjamin have determined an

actual conflict of interest exists, "the district court has no basis to order a second conflict
inquiry by Mr. Roark." (Brief, p.6.) However, the question before this Court is not
whether an "actual conflict" exists, but the nature of the inquiry the district court must
undertake to determine whether an actual conflict exists. Because the district court was
not satisfied with the information provided by the SAPD and Benjamin, the court did not
err by appointing independent conflict counsel to investigate the nature of the "possible
conflict of interest" first raised by the SAPD in the Ex Parte Notice that stems from the
SAPD's interaction with Hall's trial attorneys in Hall II while the SAPD was representing
Hall during post-conviction proceedings in Hall I, particularly since Hall has now raised
several ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in Hall II post-conviction
proceedings that may be based upon interaction with the SAPD.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The adequacy of the inquiry into a conflict of interest is a constitutional issue

over which this Court exercises free review." State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77
P.3d 124 (Ct. App. 2003); see also State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704, 215 P.3d 414
(2009).
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C.

Hall Has A Statutory Right To Conflict-Free Counsel
While the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to include the right to be

represented by conflict-free counsel, State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414
(2009) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981)), "[t]here is no Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel in a collateral attack upon a conviction." Fields
v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 291, 17 P.3d 230 (2000) (citing Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1
(1989)). 2 While Hall does not have a Sixth Amendment right to post-conviction counsel,
he does have a statutory right to counsel. Under I.C.R. 44.2(1), "Immediately following
the imposition of the death penalty, the district judge who sentenced the defendant shall
appoint at least one attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking any
post-conviction remedy referred to in I.C. § 19-2719(4) that the defendant may choose to
seek." (Emphasis added). As explained in Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687, 905
P.2d 86 (1995), when an Idaho statute provides an indigent defendant with a right to
counsel, the courts look to cases that have "discussed the manner of proving ineffective
assistance of counsel, even though the basis for the right in those cases was
constitutional, not statutory." See also Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 833-34, 203 P.3d
1221 (2009) (the statutory right to counsel enacted by the legislature for violent sexual
predators establishes a right to effective assistance of counsel and "the appropriate

2

Martinez v. Ryan, --- U.S. ---, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), has not changed this basic Sixth
Amendment principle because Martinez merely provided an "equitable ruling" that
permits a federal habeas petitioner to raise ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel as "cause" to overcome procedurally defaulted claims. Martinez expressly noted
it was "not the case" to resolve the question of whether there is a constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel during post-conviction proceedings to raise ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims. 132 S.Ct. at 1315.
10

analysis is by reference to the well-established standards governing such claims under the
Sixth Amendment").
While the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel has not been expressly
extended to post-conviction proceedings, in Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 233-34, 17
P.3d 230 (2000), the Idaho Supreme Court noted conflict of interest principles from
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), and concluded, "Because these facts do not
identify a conflict other than the one related to the trial, they also fail to support the claim
of ineffectiveness of appellate/post-conviction counsel as a result of a conflict of
interest." Moreover, as explained above, when reviewing a statutory right to counsel,
Idaho courts look to Sixth Amendment principles, which presumably include the right to
conflict-free counsel. See Hernandez, 127 Idaho at 88; Smith, 146 Idaho at 833-34.

D.

The District Court Has A Duty To Inquire Into The "Possible Conflict Of
Interest" Raised In Hall's Ex Parte Notice
"Whenever a trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular

conflict may exist, the trial court has a duty of inquiry." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53,
60, 90 P.3d 278 (2003) (emphasis added) (citing Wood v. Georgi'!, 450 U.S. 261, 272-73
(1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335, 347 (1980)).

Even when the record

demonstrates the mere ''possibility of a conflict of interest" the court has a duty to inquire
further.

Wood, 450 U.S. at 272 (emphasis in original).

The Supreme Court has

explained the duty to inquire "is not to be confused with when the trial court is aware of a
vague, unspecified possibility of conflict, such as that which 'inheres in almost every
instance of multiple representation."' Mickens v. Taylor, 53 5 U.S. 162, 168-69 (2002)
(quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348).
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As explained in Severson, 147 Idaho at 423 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 488 (1978)), "A trial court's failure to conduct an inquiry, under certain
circumstances will serve as a basis for reversing a defendant's conviction."

If the

defendant does not object and the court fails to make proper inquiry, "the defendant's
conviction will only be reversed if he or she can prove that an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lav.'Yer's performance."

Id. (citing Cuvler, 446 U.S. at 348).

However, "once a defendant raises a timely objection to a conflict, the trial court is
constitutionally obligated to determine whether an actual conflict of interest exists. A
court's failure to make a proper inquiry after a defendant's timely objection will result in
the automatic reversal of the defendant's conviction." Id.
While this duty to inquire has not been expressly extended to post-conviction
proceedings, because Idaho courts look to Sixth Amendment principles when reviewing a
statutory right to counsel, those principles presumably include the duty to inquire. See
~~~~,

127 Idaho at 88; Smith, 146 Idaho at 833-34. Moreover, several jurisdictions

have opined the duty to inquire applies in post-conviction cases irrespective of whether
there is a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. In Frazier v. State, 303 S.W.3d
674, 683 (Tenn. 2010), the court expressly expanded the duty to inquire to postconviction proceedings. In People v. Hardin, 818 N.E.2d 1246, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 2nd
2004), the court adopted a duty to inquire when "a defendant presents facts suggesting a
conflict that goes beyond the problem of one public defender having to attack another."
Finally, in

778 N.E.2d 129, 132 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002), the court held,

"the trial court had a duty in this case to inquire into the alleged conflict of interest when
Pelphrey filed his Crim. R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his guilty pleas or in the alternative
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for post-conviction relief, because at that time the court knew or should have known that
a possible conflict of interest existed."
\Vhile Hall initially appears to concede the district court had a duty to inquire, he
appears to backtrack by contending the court did not have a duty to inquire "[b]ecause the
possibility of a conflict was raised by Mr. Hall's counsel alone, and not by Mr. Hall."

703, "In order to ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court has
an affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows or reasonably
should know that a particular conflict may exist." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the
Supreme Court has explained the duty to inquire exists when the trial court is merely
aware of the "possibility of a conflict of interest." Wood, 450 U.S. at 272. The question
is not whether the defendant or counsel know of a conflict and advised the court, but
whether the court "knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist."
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 60.

Indeed, it is entirely possible the court may know or

reasonably should know of a possible conflict that could be unknown to the defendant or
his attorney. It is even possible counsel would advise a defendant not to raise a possible
conflict because counsel made the independent determination that an actual conflict does
not exist. Nevertheless, while there may not be an automatic reversal if a defendant does
not make an objection, there is still a duty to inquire, and if it is determined that an actual
conflict exists, new counsel must be appointed.
Moreover, while Hall did not raise an "objection" based upon an alleged conflict,
it was the SAPD that initially brought the issue before the district court. There was
simply no basis for the court to ignore the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice even though it did not
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constitute an "objection" based upon an actual conflict, but merely advised the court of
the possibility of a conflict. The danger associated with a possible conflict in capital
post-conviction proceedings that stems from post-conviction counsel's involvement in
the underlying trial is obvious. In English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998),
the court reexamined an Oklahoma statute requiring defendants to raise all ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal or the claim would be forfeited. The court
recognized defendants "must be allowed to obtain an objective assessment of trial
counsel's performance and must be allowed to adequately develop the factual basis for
any claim of ineffectiveness," id. at 1261 (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,

(ineffective assistance of counsel claims not raised on direct appeal were not waived if
the defendant continued to be represented by trial counsel or if the ineffectiveness claims
required investigation outside the trial record); Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 30304 (2nd Cir. 1995) (same). This principle was addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Hoffman
v. Arave, 236 F.3d

1-3 5 (9th Cir. 2000), where the court concluded, because the

same attorneys represented the defendant at trial and post-conviction, the defendant was
unable to obtain an objective assessment of trial counsel's performance and develop the
factual basis of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Likev.rise, in Carter v. State, 362
S.E.2d 20, 21 (S.C. 1987) (citing Commomyealth v. Via, 316 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1974)), the
court concluded:
When an applicant is represented on post-conviction relief by his trial
counsel, there is no waiver of the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Absent a showing that the applicant was specifically advised of the
hazards of being represented by trial counsel at the post-conviction
hearing and that the applicant consented to such an arrangement, a

14

successive post-conviction application, alleging ineffective assistance of
trial counsel, should not be barred.
It was for these reasons that I.C.R. 44.2 was implemented, requiring that capital

post-conviction counsel be someone other than trial counsel, which "satisfie[s] the
requirement that [capital post-conviction petitioners] be afforded the ability to consult
with different counsel on appeal in order to obtain an objective assessment of trial
counsel's performance." Porter v. State, 139 Idaho 420, 423 n.2, 80 PJd 1021 (2003).
Finally, as is oft repeated by the capital defense bar:
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year
or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding
difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case.
Lankford v. State, 500

.S. 110, 125 n.21 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.

280, 305 (1976) (footnote omitted)).
Based upon the SAPD's

Parte Notice and the pleadings subsequently filed by

the respective parties, coupled with heightened standards of review in capital cases, the
district court had a duty to inquire regarding the possibility of a potential conflict of
interest stemming from the SAPD's contact with Hall's trial attorneys in Hall II.

E.

The District Court Was Permitted To Establish The Parameters Ofits Inquiry Into
The "Possible Conflict Ofinterest" Raised In the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice
"In order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court's examination of the

potential conflict must be thorough and searching and should be conducted on the
record.

The court must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the defendant's

dissatisfaction, distrust or concern."

Severson, 215 P.3d at 424 (emphasis added)
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(internal quotations and citations omitted). The inquiry must also be '"targeted at the
conflict issue."'

State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124 (Ct. App. 2003)

(quoting Selsor v. Kaiser, 81F.3d1492, 1501 (10th Cir. 1996)). While trial courts are
"entitled to rely on representations made by counsel," they "may inquire further into the
facts." Id. (citing Kaplan v. United States, 375 F.2d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 1967)).
Because the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice was, as conceded by counsel, "not very
specific," "opaque,'' and "didn't include any facts" (Tr., pp.241-42), the trial court was
not able to "target" the exact concern being raised by the SAPD. Undoubtedly, the
district court's concern was piqued by the concession that the "SAPD cooperated with
trial counsel in Hall II by sharing testing and expert information obtained in Hall I" (Ex
Parte Notice, p.2), particularly in light of the claims in the amended post-conviction

petition that challenged trial counsels' effectiveness regarding testing and expert
witnesses (R., pp.177-83, 221-26, 241-45). Moreover, the SAPD's assertion that "Ms.
Romero became aware that Mr. Ackley and/or Ms. Swenson may have had contact with
trial counsel and that contact may present a conflict of interest in the SAPD's continued
representation of Mr. Hall" (Ex Parte Notice, pp.2-3) would have caused the district court
significant consternation, resulting in the conclusion that there was even more "contact"
between the SAPD and trial counsel than sharing of "testing and expert infonnation."
This is particularly important because the amended petition raised an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim that was based upon a "complete breakdown in the attorneyclient relationship" (R., pp.121-22), which could have been exacerbated by contact with
the SAPD. Indeed, the SAPD was concerned enough that Benjamin was retained to
"independently evaluate the conflict" and "advise Mr. Hall whether or not a conflict
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should be waived." (Id., p.3.) Moreover, the SAPD conceded the filing of the Ex Parte
Notice "has to cause the Court some concern." (Tr., p.284.)
The district court's concern obviously was not alleviated by the SAPD's
Amended Notice of Possible Conflict of Interest (R., pp.1336-40), but actually increased
the necessity of conducting a "thorough and searching inquiry." For example, discussing
the "contact" that "may present a conflict of interest,'' the SAPD merely explained there
were "numerous contacts between trial counsel and post-conviction counsel" that
occurred "[o ]ver the course of several months,'' which included: (1) e-mails, "primarily"
between Ackley and Kristal; (2) phone calls between Ackley and Kristal or Chastain; (3)
at least two meetings "where all attorneys were present"; and (4) additional contacts with
SAPD staff to facilitate the exchange of information regarding testing and experts. (R.,
p.1338.) Because the SAPD explained the Ex Parte Motion "was filed due to the extent
of the communications between counsel" (id.) (emphasis added), this was not de minimus
contact, and the district court had every right to be concerned and want further inquiry.
Likewise, Benjamin's affidavit would not have alleviated the district court's
concerns because it also failed to discuss the nature of the communication between the
SAPD and trial counsel, merely explaining, "The conflict issue centers around the
communication between former SAPD lawyers, i.e., Paula Swenson and Mark Ackley,
and Mr. Hall's trial lawyers, i.e., Robert Chastain and Deborah Kristal, before and during
the second trial."

(Benjamin Affidavit, p.2.)

Rather than explain the genesis of the

SAPD's concern regarding the "extent of the communications between counsel" that
generated the Ex Parte Notice, Benjamin merely explained when the "communication
could result in a conflict of interest" (R., p.2) and that "there is no conflict of interest"
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(Id., p.4). Nevertheless, despite his conclusion regarding the existence of a conflict,
Benj arnin noted there was one exception where it "appears one of the former SAPD
la'A-yers gave advice to the trial law}'ers to take a certain action." (Id., p.5.) While
Benjamin concluded there was still no conflict even though the "trial

la~ers

took that

advice and the result was favorable to Mr. Hall" (id.), there is no indication regarding the
nature or subject matter of the advice that would permit the trial court to make its own
determination regarding the existence of a conflict of interest.
Hall's primary complaint stems from the district court's decision to appoint Roark
to conduct an investigation regarding the possibility of a conflict of interest raised in
Hall's Ex Parte Notice.

(Brief, pp.11-16.) While the state certainly appreciates the

SAPD's desire to conserve resources by forcing the district court to merely rely upon the
investigation and representations of Benjamin, the court's duty to conduct a "thorough
and searching" inquiry cannot be abrogated and given to an attorney retained by the very
entity that may have precipitated the alleged conflict; it is the court's inquiry, not
counsels' or someone chosen by counsel.

As explained in Harjo v. Reynolds, 894

F.Supp. 1496, 1501 (N.D. Okla. 1995):
The Holloway court denied the suggestion it was transferring to
defense counsel the authority of the trial judge to rule on the existence or
risk of a conflict and to appoint separate counsel. It said "our holding
does not preclude a trial court from exploring the adequacy of the basis for
defense counsel's representations regarding a conflict of interests without
improperly requiring disclosure of the confidential communications of the
client." Id. at 487, 98 S.Ct. at 1180. The Court also noted the trial court
could discipline counsel who presented such motions for dilatory
purposes.
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See also Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347 ("Unless the trial court knows or reasonably should
know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry") (emphasis
added).
The state recognizes "[a]n attorney ... is in the best position professionally and
ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the
course of a trial," Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485 (internal quotations and citation omitted),
that defense attorneys "are officers of the court, and when they address the judge
solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually made under
oath," id. at 486, and that "trial courts necessarily rely in large measure upon the good
faith and good judgment of defense counsel," Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347. See also-===
States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations and
citation omitted) ("In ascertaining whether the risk of conflict warrants appointment of
separate counsel, the court is entitled to rely on the good faith and good judgment of
defense counsel who represents to the court that no conflict exists"). However, while
courts may rely upon the representations of counsel, "[a] court may inquire further into
the facts."

14 7 Idaho at 704. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has explained, "it is

good practice for a trial judge to make inquiry when the possibility of a conflict of
interest seems apparent." Willis v. United States, 614 F.2d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 1979).
As explained in Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Ci:r. 1994), "the trial
judge here should have conducted his own neutral inquiry as soon as he heard [counsel's]
disclosure, in order to reach his own informed judgment."

When presented with a

possible conflict of interest claim, "at a minimum the trial court should have requested
that [counsel] give him some idea of what the conflict entailed to allow him to determine
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whether to order [counsel] to withdraw." United States v. DeRobertis, 771 F.2d 1057,

Cir. 1992), the mere reading of a file and colloquy with defense counsel may not be
sufficient inquiry. Moreover, the need to conduct a thorough and searching inquiry "does
not preclude a trial court from exploring the adequacy of the basis of defense counsel's
representations regarding a conflict of interest without improperly requiring disclosure of
the confidential communications of the client." Holloway:, 435 U.S. at 487.
The difficulties of this inquiry and the determination that an attorney must be
disqualified due to a conflict of interest are discussed in United States v. Evanson, 584
F.2d 904, 911 (10th Cir. 2009).

The Tenth Circuit recognized "the need for appellate

courts to be highly deferential to the trial judge's judgment" because
[d]isqualification motions . . . are not assessed "with the wisdom of
hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier pre-trial context
when relationships between the parties are seen through a glass, darkly."
To assess "[t]he likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of
interest," the courts must predict how events will unfold at trial, a daunting
task that can require an exercise of "instinct and judgment based on
experience."
Id. (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162-63 (1988)). Therefore, the "facts
and circumstances of each case ... must be left to the informed judgment of the trial
court" because
(c]ourts confronting potential conflicts of interest face the prospect of
being whip-sawed by assertions of error no matter which way they rule. If
a court disqualifies counsel, the defendant can raise ... a claim that he
was denied his Sixth Amendment right to chosen counsel. But if the court
declines to disqualify counsel, the defendant may claim that his counsel's
conflict of interest resulted in constitutionally ineffective performance at
trial.
(internal quotes and citations omitted).
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Hall's final complaint stems from his contention that "any possible conflict
created by actions taken by Ms. Swenson or Mr. Ackley could not be imputed to Mr.
Hall's current post-conviction counsel at the SAPD." (Brief, pp.14-15.) However, Hall
is arguing the proverbial "cart before the horse"; the issue is not whether a conflict exists
or the nature of the alleged conflict, but the nature of the inquiry that must be conducted
to determine the existence of a conflict. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court:
Once a court conducts an inquiry, it must determine whether a conflict
actually exists. If the court concludes defense counsel does have a
conflict, it must obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver from the
defendant or give the defendant an opportunity to acquire new counsel. If
on the other hand, the court concludes that a conflict of interest does not
exist, the representation may continue without a waiver.
Severson, 147 Idaho at 704 (internal citations omitted).
Moreover, if the underlying basis for the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice was nothing
more than contact between Hall's trial attorneys in Hall II and former employees of the
SAPD while representing Hall in Hall I post-conviction proceedings and it is Hall's
position that such contact did not amount to a potential conflict of interest, why did the
SAPD file the Ex Parte Notice and retain Benjamin to determine whether an actual
conflict exists? Clearly, neither the SAPD nor Benjamin has adequately explained the
underlying basis of the contact that resulted in the filing of the SAPD's Ex Parte Notice.
Rather, as explained by the court, "Instead of being forthcoming and candid with the
Court about the facts in this case, the SAPD has chosen to alert the Court to the vague
possibility of some unnamed conflict, hire outside counsel on the conflict issue only, and
defer all questions to Mr. Benjamin even though he represents the Petitioner and not the
SAPD." (R., pp.1373-74.) As the court recognized, "its duty to conduct a thorough and
searching inquiry would [not] be satisfied in this case by simply accepting the opinions of
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counsel regarding whether a conflict exists without any disclosure of the factual basis for
that opinion" because the court "is presently lacking the factual background necessary to
reach any conclusion." (R., p.1374.)
Because the district court has an independent duty to conduct its own thorough
and searching inquiry regarding the possibility of a conflict of interest first raised in the
SAPD's Ex Parte Notice, Hall has failed to establish the court erred by appointing Roark
to assist the court in conducting that inquiry.

II.
Because It Was Not Raised Before The District Court, Hall Has Waived His
Separation Of Powers Claim

A.

Introduction
Hall contends the district court's order requiring the SAPD to pay for Roark's

services violates the separation of powers doctrine of art. II, § 1, of the Idaho
Constitution. (Brief, pp.16-25.)
While Hall challenged the district court's authority to require the SAPD to pay for
Roark's services, the argument was never couched in the context of a separation of
powers violation. Indeed, with the exception of art. VII, § 13 (R., pp.1408-09), Idaho's
Constitution was never cited to the district court, let alone art. II, § 1 of the Idaho
Constitution. Because Hall never raised this argument in the court below, providing the
district court with an opportunity to rule upon this issue, it has been waived on appeal.
Even if the issue was properly raised, because LC. § 19-871 merely requires the SAPD to
pay for the services of conflict counsel and does not prohibit the district court from
making an appropriate appointment, Hall's claim fails.
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B.

Hall's Separation Of Powers Claim Was Waived Because It Was Not Raised
Before The District Court
It is well settled that constitutional issues will not be considered when raised for

the first time on appeal. State v. Ransom, 137 Idaho 560, 565, 50 P.3d 1055 (Ct. App.
2002) (citing State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992); State v.
Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 645, 945 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Ct. App. 1997)). Furthermore,
failure to raise an issue in the district court, thereby denying the trial court the
opportunity to rule on the alleged error, constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal. State
v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322 (1991); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178,
181, 824 P.2d 109 (1991); State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450, 454, 942 P.2d 574 (Ct. App.
1997).

The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly applied this fundamental appellate

doctrine to claims based upon the separation of powers doctrine. Fodge, 121 Idaho at
195. Likewise it has been applied to other constitutional challenges. Ransom, 13 7 Idaho
at 565; State v. Hardman, 120 Idaho 667, 672, 818 P.2d 782 (Ct. App. 1991).
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, ---, 245
P.3d 961, 979 (2010).

Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Hall

demonstrate the error he alleges:

"(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived

constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information
not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Id. at 980.
Hall's separation of powers claim fails because, not only has he failed to argue
fundamental error, the first prong of Perry cannot be met since his claim is not alleged to
have violated federal constitutional rights, but is a challenge under Idaho's constitution.
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C.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of

deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). The interpretation of a statute is a
question of law this Court reviews de novo." State v. Schultz, 151 Idaho 863, 865, 264
P.3d 970 (2011).

D.

Hall Has Failed To Establish The District Court's Order Requiring The SAPD To
Pay For Roark's Services Violates The Separation Of Powers Clause
Hall's argument is premised upon art. II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution and the

contention that LC. § 19-871 prohibits the district court from appointing conflict counsel
and making the SAPD pay for the services of conflict counsel. (Brief, pp.16-24.) Hall
has simply misunderstood LC. § 19-871.
Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution reads as follows:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person
or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly
belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly
directed or permitted.
In 1998, the legislature enacted the State Appellate Public Defender Act to reduce
the financial burden to the counties associated with the costs of legal representation of
indigent defendants, particularly convictions for first-degree murder, by "provid[ing]
competent counsel but avoid paying high hourly rates to independent counsel to represent
indigent defendants in appellate proceedings." 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.389, pp.1190-
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95; LC. § 19-868. Duties of the SAPD include representation of certain felony appeals
and post-conviction relief proceedings in district court in capital cases. LC. § 19-870(1 ).
Idaho Code § 19-870(3) permits the SAPD to "employ deputy state appellate public
defenders and other employees necessary to carry out the responsibilities of the office"
and "contract with private attorneys to provide representation on a case-by-case basis
when such contracts would conserve budgetary resources." Additionally, LC. § 19-871
addresses those situations where the SAPD is "unable to carry out the duties required in
this act." In its entirety, it reads as follows:
Should the state appellate public defenders be unable to carry out
the duties required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other
reason, the state appellate public defender shall arrange for counsel for
indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of the state
appellate public defender.
Id. (emphasis added).
While LC. 19-870(3) permits the SAPD to "contract with private attorneys ...
when such contracts would conserve budgetary resources," LC.§ 19-871 does not require
nor even permit the SAPD to "arrange" for the appointment of conflict counsel when
there is "a conflict of counsel or any other reason," but only for the compensation of
conflict counsel. In non-capital post-conviction cases, LC. § 19-4904 permits the district
court to appoint counsel "[i]f the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of
representation, including ... a court appointed attorney. While LC. § 19-4904 requires
the costs be borne by the respective county, based upon LC. § 19-871, the SAPD must
"arrange for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of the
state appellate public defender." However, because the State Appellate Public Defender
Act merely permits the SAPD to "contract with private attorneys ... when such contracts
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would conserve budgetary resources," but only allows the SAPD to "arrange for counsel
for indigent defendants to be compensated" when the SAPD is "unable to carry out the
duties required in this act because of a conflict of interest or any other reason," the
district court must be permitted, pursuant to LC. § 19-4904, to appoint conflict counsel in
capital post-conviction cases whom the SAPD must arrange to be "compensated out of
the budget of the state appellate public defender" under I. C. § 19-8 71.
This interpretation of the State Appellate Public Defender Act is based upon a
plain reading of the Act and the plain meaning of the words in the Act, which constitutes
the basis for determining the legislature's intent when it was enacted. As explained in
State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 867, 264 P.3d 970 (2011) (quoting Farber v. Idaho State
Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 310, 208 P.3d 289 (2009)):
"The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory interpretation begins with
the literal language of the statute. Provisions should not be read in
isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document.
The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given
their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the
Court must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that
none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language
is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must
be given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory
construction."
Moreover, it is consistent with I.C.R. 44.2(1 ), which reads as follows:
Immediately following the imposition of the death penalty, the
district judge who sentences the defendant shall appoint at least one
attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking any postconviction remedy referred to in I.C. § 19-2719(4) that the defendant may
choose to seek. This appointment shall be made in compliance with the
standards set forth in Idaho Criminal Rule 44.3, and the attorney appointed
shall be someone other than counsel who represented the defendant prior
to the imposition of the death penalty. This new counsel shall not be
considered to be co-counsel with any other attorney who represents the
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defendant, but may also be appointed to pursue the direct appeal for the
defendant.
While LC. § 19-870 requires the appointment of the SAPD in capital postconviction proceedings in those counties participating in the capital crimes defense act
and where the petitioner was sentenced on or after September 1, 1998, there is no
limitation on the district court's ability to appoint conflict counsel in capital postconviction proceedings. Moreover, because I.C.R. 44.2(1) still requires that capital postconviction counsel meet the standards of I.C.R. 44.3, the district court has final authority
over the appointment of post-conviction counsel even if it does not involve conflict
counsel, while the SAPD has authority and is mandated under l.C. § 19-871 to "arrange
for counsel for indigent defendants to be compensated out of the budget of the state
appellate defender." (Emphasis added.) In other words, if the district court concluded
the SAPD did not meet the requirements of !.C.R. 44.3, the court has authority to appoint
counsel that is qualified and order that attorney be compensated out of the SAPD' s
budget. The same would be true anytime the district court concluded the SAPD was
"unable to carry out the duties required in [the] act because of a conflict of interest or any
other reason," I.C. § 19-871 (emphasis added), including a "thorough and searching"

inquiry into whether a conflict of interest exists based upon prior contact between the
SAPD and trial counsel that was actually raised by the SAPD in its

Parte Notice.

Moreover, as explained in the preceding section, because it is the district court's duty to
conduct the inquiry and determine the procedure to be utilized to conduct the inquiry, it is
simply irrelevant that the SAPD had already contracted with Benjamin, particularly when
the district court concluded his inquiry was insufficient.
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Because the district court has authority over the appointment of capital postconviction counsel, Hall has failed to establish the district court's order appointing Roark
violates the separation of powers doctrine.

III.
The District Court Did Not Err By Requiring The Possible Disclosure Of Attorney-Client
Communications To Either Roark Or The District Court
A.

Introduction
Relying upon I.R.E. 502 and I.R.P.C. 1.6, Hall contends the district court erred by

requiring the SAPD to allegedly disclose material that is protected by the attorney-client
privilege to Roark.

(Brief, pp.25-35.)

While Hall spends considerable space

differentiating between the two rules, the state acknowledges, while similar, they are
different concepts, and I.R.P.C. 1.6 is a broader rule relating to the information a client
provides during the attorney's representation of the client. See l.R.P. C. 1.6, commentary
3. Nevertheless, because the district court has the duty to conduct a "thorough and
searching" inquiry to ascertain the existence of an actual conflict, particularly when the
possibility of that conflict was raised by Hall, there is no violation of the rules of
confidentiality when that information is provided to Roark or the district court.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The district court's conclusion whether 'statements are protected by an

individual attorney-client privilege is a mixed question of law and fact which this court
reviews independently and without deference to the district court."' United States v.
Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 563 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148,
1158 (9th Cir. 2010)).
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C.

The Court Is Permitted To Inquire Into Confidential Information When
Conducting Its Inquiry
Rule 1.6(a) of the LR.P.C. states, "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating

to representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted
by paragraph (b ). " Rule 1.6(b) explains, "A lawyer may reveal information relating to
the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary ...
(6) to comply with other law or a court order." Apparently, Hall's argument is based
upon the contention that the district court's order is too broad because, according to Hall,
"[i]t is entirely unnecessary to waive Mr. Hall's privilege and confidentiality with the
SAPD or Mr. Benjamin, and order the complete disclosure of files, in order to discover
the nature of conversations between the SAPD attorneys and trial counsel, where the
district court has already waived the attorney-client privilege regarding Mr. Chastain and
Mr. [sic] Kristal." (Brief, p.32.)

However, as detailed above, the inquiry that must be conducted by the district
court cannot be transferred to the SAPD, Benjamin, or even Roark, but is an inquiry that
must

conducted by the district court in a fashion that permits the court to conduct a

"thorough and searching" inquiry such that the court can detennine whether a conflict of
interests exists with the SAPD. Moreover, Hall's reliance upon Holloway, the only case
he cites to support his position, is misplaced. Addressing the state's concern that reliance
upon counsel's representation that there was no conflict was tantamount to transferring
the decision to counsel and counsel might abuse that authority for purposes of delay or
obstruction of the trial, the Supreme Court explained its holding "did not impair the trial
court's ability to deal with counsel who resort to such tactics. Nor does our holding

29

preclude a trial court from exploring the adequacy of the basis of defense counsel's
representations regarding a conflict of interest without improperly requiring disclosure of
the confidential communications of the client." Id. The Court continued, "This case does
not require an inquiry into the extent of a court's power to compel an attorney to disclose
confidential communications that he concludes would be damaging to his client." Id. at
487 n.11.

In dicta, the Court further noted, "Such compelled disclosure creates

significant risks of unfair prejudice, especially when the disclosure is to a judge who may
be called upon later to impose sentences on the attorney's clients." Id.
However, because the extent of Rule 1.6 is a matter of state law, this Court is not
bound to follow the dicta in Holloway. Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So.2d 263, 266 n.2 (Fla.
2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Additionally, this is not a case where the SAPD stated there is
an actual conflict of interest and the state or the district court were concerned about the
validity of the allegation. Rather, the inquiry into whether a possible conflict exists was
initiated by the SAPD when the Ex Parte Notice was filed seeking a determination of
whether an actual conflict exists. Based upon the exceptionally vague nature of the Ex
Parte Notice and the SAPD's and Benjamin's refusal to provide necessary information,

the district court was mandated to explore options that might not normally exist,
including Roark's appointment. As explained in Knix v. State, 922 P.2d 913, 919 n.7
(Alaska 1996), conducting in camera proceedings or appointing independent conflict
counsel that could intrude upon an attorney's relationship with a client is appropriate
"upon a substantial showing of necessity." As detailed above, based upon the actions of
the SAPD and Benjamin, that showing has been met in Hall's case.
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Moreover, Hall has failed to cite any case reversing a trial court's decision that
the "thorough and searching" inquiry requires the disclosure of attorney-client
communication. Indeed, it appears such inquiries would mandate at least some disclosure
of attorney-client communications, provided they are conducted in camera or are
otherwise not disclosed to the state. In United States v. Burnett, 2009 WL 3747204, * 1
(E.D. Tenn. 2009), the defendant complained he had a "complete loss of trust" in his
attorney and demanded new counsel be appointed. Because the defendant had the burden
of establishing "good cause such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in
communication or an irreconcilable conflict" before substitute counsel could be
appointed, the district court "conducted a sealed, ex parte hearing to inquire into the
reasons for the Defendant's dissatisfaction" with his attorney that resulted in the court
hearing "confidential statements from [the attorney] and the Defendant in order to
determine whether good cause for the appointment of new counsel" existed. Id.; see also
United States v. Monday, 2009 WL 2745998, *1 (E.D. Tenn. 2009). In Hamilton v.
Ford, 969 F.2d 1006, 1012-13 (11th Cir. 1992), the court concluded "the reading of a file
for an unrelated purpose is inadequate exploration of the possibility of conflict" and "by
asking defense counsel to disclose trial strategy in open court, the trial court improperly
placed counsel in a situation where in order to adequately respond he would have had to
disclose client confidence, thereby breaching attorney/client confidentiality." However,
at no time has the district court asked any of Hall's attorneys to "disclose trial strategy in
open court." Rather, the information that is to be gathered by Roark is itself confidential
and will be provided only to the district court, not the state.
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Finally, Hall's concern that once the attorney-client privilege or rule of
confidentiality is waived, it is waived forever and the protection cannot be restored is
overstated.

(Brief, p.34.)

There is no indication that if confidential information is

obtained it will ever be provided to the state. Rather, as explained above, the information
can be provided to the district court in camera. Moreover, the alleged dangers associated
with providing the district court confidential information is grossly overstated. Judges
are regularly bombarded by information that cannot be considered in future decisions,
including pretrial hearings, post-conviction proceedings after having sat during the
underlying trial and sentencing, retrials, resentencings. Nevertheless, judges are expected
to disregard the prior information and make judicial rulings based upon admissible
evidence.

In State v. Beam. 115 Idaho 208, 215, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the court

explained the parameters of motions to disqualify judges based upon bias and information
gleaned from prior or other proceedings:
Every trial judge who rules upon a post conviction review
proceeding or an I.C.R. 35 motion to reduce sentence will previously have
prejudged the matter, often forming extremely strong opinions as to the
sentence which should be imposed, and will no doubt be convinced that
the procedure followed and the sentence imposed was correct, particularly
where the trial court proceedings have been affirmed on appeal by this
Court. It would be an unusual case in which a trial judge, when called
upon to rule on an LC.R. 35 motion to reduce sentence, would not
approach the case on the basis that the sentence imposed was correct, and
require the defendant to shoulder "the burden of showing that the original
sentence was unduly severe." State v. Martinez, 113 Idaho 535, 536, 746
P.2d 994, 995 (1987). Coming to the case with that frame of mind does
not constitute bias or prejudice within the meaning of I.C.R. 25(b )(4) and
does not require disqualification of the trial judge. In this case the judge
in question had presided at the trial of both Beam and Scroggins. He had
heard all of the evidence regarding this brutal murder and raping of an
innocent thirteen year old girl. He had presided at the sentencing
proceedings in which extensive mitigation and aggravation evidence was
presented to the court. Based upon all of that evidence, the trial court then
arrived at the judgment that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the
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mitigating circumstances and sentenced both defendants to death. The
death penalty is reserved for only the most heinous of first degree
murders. The very nature of the sentencing process in capital cases
requires a trial judge to form strong opinions and convictions that the
defendant merits the most severe penalty. It would be extremely unlikely
and no doubt improper for a trial court to impose a death penalty unless it
had formed the strong opinion and belief that the defendant had no
redeeming features, and that the circumstances of this particular case
justified the imposition of this most serious penalty known to the law.
Accordingly, when a trial judge is called upon to rule upon a petition for
post conviction relief, or a motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R.
35, particularly in a case where the death penalty has been imposed, he
comes to the case after having already formed strong opinions and beliefs
regarding the atrocious nature of the crime, the unredeemable character of
the defendant, and the need of society to impose this most serious of
criminal penalties. A trial judge is not required to erase from his mind all
that has gone before, and indeed, it is doubtful that any human being
could. Rather, when faced with an I.C.R. 25(b)(4) motion to disqualify for
bias and prejudice in a post conviction or I.C.R. 35 proceeding, the trial
judge need only conclude that he can properly perform the legal
analysis which the law requires of him, recognizing that he has already
pre-judged the case and has formed strong and lasting opinions regarding
the worth of the defendant and the sentence that ought to be imposed to
punish the defendant and protect society.
(Emphasis added); see also State v. Jones, 146 Idaho 297, 298-99, 193 P.3d 457 (Ct.
App. 2008).
The Ninth Circuit has explained:
But even if a case has been reversed on appeal, it has long been regarded
as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand
and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant. While some
may argue that a judge will feel the motivation to vindicate a prior
conclusion when confronted with a question for the second or third time,
for instance, upon trial after a remand, ... we accept the notion that the
conscientious judge will, as far as possible, make himself aware of his
biases of this character, and, by that very self-knowledge, nullify their
effect.
Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 924 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit has further discussed the issue of judicial bias stemming from
an Idaho capital case where the petitioner contended the trial judge's presiding over his
co-defendant's case not only constituted actual bias, but the appearance of bias. Paradis
v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 1994). The court rejected this argument, explaining,
"Paradis' entire argument is based upon the mistaken notion that a trial judge's exposure
to evidence, standing alone, demonstrates bias."
117 F.3d 1094, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1997)
(internal quotations and citations omitted), " The fact that the trial judge in the original
trial was also the trial judge in the second trial is insufficient to establish bias and
prejudice. It has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same
case upon its remand and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant." See

recuse himself when subsequently sentencing defendant on retrial in a capital case).
There is simply no basis for concluding a judge cannot or will not apply these
same principles to information that may otherwise be protected by attorney-client
confidentiality.
Further, even when protected information has been provided to the state, it may
not be used in future proceedings. As explained in ~ittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715,
718 (9th Cir. 2003), "a litigant waives the attorney client privilege by putting the lawyer's
performance at issue during the course of litigation." When ineffective assistance of
counsel claims are raised in post-conviction, the courts have concluded there is an
implied waiver associated with confidential communications between trial counsel and
the petitioner. Id. at 719; Reed v. State, 640 So.2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 1994); Sanborn v.
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Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905, 910 (Ky. 1998).

Nevertheless, the state is not

permitted to utilize such information if a retrial or resentencing is required. Bittaker, 331
F.3d at 727-28. The state is certainly not asking that any confidential communications be
provided to the state, but submits the attorney-client privilege is not, as contended by
Hall, "waived forever."
Additionally, the implied waiver doctrine discussed in Bittaker and other cases is
associated with the "fairness principle," which is "often expressed in terms of preventing
a party from using the privilege as both a shield and a sword." Id. at 719. While the state
is not requesting that any confidential information be provided to the state, Hall's Ex
Parte Notice certainly has the appearance of "using the privilege as both a shield and a

sword"; he has raised the issue of a possible conflict of interest between the SAPD and
trial counsel - possibly interjecting error into future post-conviction proceedings - but is
unwilling to provide the district court with the information necessary to conduct the
thorough and searching inquiry mandated by the United States Supreme Court and Idaho
Supreme Court. The state and the district court must have the ability to establish for the
record and future appellate review whether the contact between the SAPD and Hall II
trial counsel resulted in a conflict of interest when Hall has raised ineffective assistance
of counsel claims that may involve the SAPD's interjection into the trial and sentencing
phases of Hall II, particularly since I.C.R. 44.2 was expressly enacted to prevent the very
conflict that was being investigated by the district court and provide Hall "an objective
assessment of trial counsel's performance" by independent counsel. See English, 146
F.3d at 1259; Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 231-35. Simply stated, if the attorneys from the
SAPD's office had abided by the duties provided by the legislature in LC. § 19-870 and
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not interjected themselves into Hall II trial and sentencing proceedings by apparently
having unspecified contact with the Hall II trial attorneys, these issues would have been
avoided.

However, Hall wants to utilize the doctrines and rules associated with

confidential attorney-client communications as a shield to prevent the district court from
conducting the thorough and searching inquiry into the possible conflict raised by the
SAPD in the Ex Parte Notice that cannot even be "targeted" because the SAPD will not
provide the information the district court needs for the inquiry. This "shield and sword"
mentality cannot be tolerated by this Court.
On the basis of the rather unique facts associated with this case, Hall has failed to
establish the district court erred.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that the district court's interlocutory orders, (1)
Memorandum Decision and Order Appointing Keith Roark as Independent Conflict
Counsel and (2) Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to Reconsider;
and Supplementing the Original Decision and Order, be affirmed on appeal.
DATED this zgth day of August, 2012.

Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
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